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Abstract 
Bidders have an incentive to pay with stock when their shares are overvalued, but target firms 
should be reluctant to accept such overvalued payment. In a sample of 2,978 acquisitions, we 
find that stock payment is readily accepted only when the bidder can justify the financing 
decision in terms of such economic fundamentals as optimal capital structure. Yet even when the 
fundamentals justify stock payment, paying with cash is common. In that way, firms can 
preclude paying with undervalued stock and are more likely to experience positive long-term 
excess returns. 
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1. Introduction 
Stock-financed acquisitions coincide with periods of high market valuation (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 
2005; Dong et al., 2006) and negative long-term returns (Asquith, 1983; Agrawal et al., 1992; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). It is easy to conclude that overvalued 
acquirers have an incentive to pay with stock, but it is less obvious why target firms should 
accept stock payment if it provides a clear signal of overvaluation. Possible explanations range 
from investor irrationality (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and correlation in valuation errors 
(Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) to shareholder inertia (Baker et al., 2007) and 
governance problems in the target firm (Hartzell et al., 2004). However, most of these arguments 
are better suited for transactions with dispersed shareholders (e.g., equity issues) than for 
acquisition transactions, in which the acquirer must negotiate with the target’s management and 
financial advisors. 
Acquisition finance can be driven by motives other than market timing (i.e., paying with 
overvalued stock). Harford et al. (2009) and Uysal (2011) show that, when a bidder’s leverage is 
higher than “optimal”, it is less likely to finance a bid with debt than with equity. Other factors 
affecting acquisition finance include the taxation of cash and stock offers (Gilson et al., 1988), 
risk sharing (Hansen, 1987), and differences in SEC requirements (Martin, 1996). We argue that 
target firms will be less concerned about the bidder’s potential overvaluation in stock-financed 
acquisitions when that payment choice can be explained by such “rational” motives. For 
example, an overlevered bidder can justify equity financing in terms of moving to an optimal 
capital structure. But if the bidding firm proposes to pay with stock in the absence of such a 
rational justification, the target’s management will (reasonably) conclude that the stock is 
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overvalued. In that case the target will demand more shares (i.e., the acquiring firm must pay a 
higher premium) to compensate for the implied discount, which eliminates the bidder’s 
advantage in such a financing strategy. 
In short, we expect that bidders can pay with overvalued stock only if they can justify 
doing so. In contrast, there should be no problem paying with cash even if prediction models 
forecast equity financing. The choice of cash payment may indicate that the bidder’s stock is 
undervalued, but that would be irrelevant to the target firm because a cash transaction price is not 
sensitive to the acquirer’s stock price. Technically, we estimate a model that aims to predict 
acquisition finance using a variety of variables proposed in the literature. Any such prediction 
model will make errors, and if these errors are random then we should observe stock acquisitions 
where cash was predicted and cash acquisitions where stock was predicted. However, if the 
target’s management views deviations from that model as evidence of bidder overvaluation, then 
we should see fewer unexpected stock-financed deals than unexpected cash-financed deals. 
In line with this intuition, we find that only 1% of our sample acquirers make stock 
financing decisions that cannot be justified by a prediction model—a conclusion that is robust to 
various model specifications. Issuing stock when it cannot be justified (e.g., in terms of moving 
to an optimal capital structure) is nearly impossible. A closer look at the rare cases in which this 
does occur reveals that nearly all involve tender offers made directly to the shareholders. Many 
such offers are viewed as hostile, and target firms may well seek to defend themselves by 
attracting competing bids (“white knights”). 
In contrast, acquirers are able to pay with overvalued stock (and they experience long-
term negative excess returns, which is consistent with overvaluation) when that payment choice 
can be justified. The stock-financed bid of a young and high-growth firm, for instance, is 
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unlikely to attract suspicion even if its stock is overvalued. In other words, acquirers can benefit 
from market timing if they can convincingly explain the equity payment method. The target’s 
management is less reluctant to accept unexpected cash payment, which is consistent with the 
argument that the value of cash is not sensitive to information. Cash payment when the model 
instead predicts stock payment occurs in about 10% of our sample. We find that these 
transactions are driven by undervaluation, as the bidder’s stock experiences significant positive 
excess returns during the two years after the acquisition announcement. 
This paper makes three principal contributions. First, we develop a model that predicts 
acquisition finance, based on empirical and theoretical contributions from the  capital structure 
and acquisition finance literature, which takes both acquirer and target leverage into account. 
The model predicts the acquisition financing choice in 89% of the cases examined and improves 
the Pseudo-R2 by 38% compared to previous models that only consider the acquirer’s leverage. 
Second, the prediction errors are clearly asymmetric: firms are 10 times as likely to pay cash 
when the prediction model forecasts equity financing than to issue equity when the model 
predicts cash payment. Hence timing acquisitions —as reflected by long-run negative excess 
returns after equity-financed acquisitions—is not possible unless the bidder can convince the 
target firm’s management that equity finance makes economic sense. Finally, the extensively 
documented evidence that cash-financed acquisitions are followed by long-term positive excess 
returnsa must be qualified: this generalization holds only when the economic fundamentals 
predict equity financing. In other words, firms that are expected to pay cash do not exhibit such 
positive returns. 
                                                 
a
 See, for example, Asquith (1983), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Agrawal et al. (1992), 
and Dong et al. (2006). 
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Many empirical studies investigate acquisitions. Our paper primarily builds on three 
strands of this literature. Harford et al. (2009) and Uysal (2011) document a link between the 
acquirer’s capital structure and acquisition finance. We extend their prediction model with 
information on the target firm and use it as a basis for our analysis on deviations from predicted 
leverage, the focus of our paper. In particular, we link such deviations to information asymmetry 
and show that undervalued acquirers succeed in market timing while overvalued acquirers only 
succeed if they have fundamental reasons to pay with equity. This result not only extends the 
analysis of the capital structure literature, but also provides an explanation why rational target 
managers accept overvalued shares. In doing so, it provides a framework that reconciles the 
market timing literature (e.g., Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005, Dong et al., 2006, Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003) with the non-behavioral side of the literature. Finally, our methodology builds on the 
literature on expectations in merger announcements (Malatesta and Thomson, 1985, Eckbo et al., 
1990, Cremers et al., 2009, and Cornett et al., 2011). These papers predict merger candidacy and 
link subsequent returns to the surprise effect of the announcement. We adapt their methodology 
to a different topic, the payment method in M&A: we predict the financing method and link 
subsequent returns to the information effect in expected and actual payment method.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we describe in detail our predictions of the 
acquisition finance method. Section 5 documents announcement returns. Section 6 examines the 
extent to which long-term stock price behavior is consistent with our theory’s predictions. In 
Section 7 we summarize our conclusions. 
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2. Hypotheses development 
2.1. The acquisition process 
Consider the following stylized acquisition process. The bidder makes an offer and specifies 
whether it will be paid in cash or stock. The target’s management either accepts or renegotiates 
the price. If the deal is closed then the acquirer pays the agreed-upon price in the agreed-upon 
structure, and the two entities are combined into one firm. The capital structure of the combined 
firm depends on the leverage of acquirer and target as well as on the payment method. The 
resulting capital structure may be suboptimal, the costs of which are incurred by the combined 
firm. 
The bidder’s management seeks to minimize not only the transaction price but also the 
subsequent costs of deviating from an optimal capital structure. The target’s management, 
however, seeks mainly to maximize the transaction price. This assumption is realistic if the 
target’s management acts on behalf of long-term shareholders and/or is incentivized with equity 
compensation or takeover-related bonuses (see Hartzell et al., 2004 for a description of the 
prevalence and effects of related governance provisions).  
To derive predictions on market timing, we consider potential information asymmetry 
concerning the bidder’s value. In particular, the bidder may be over- or undervalued by the 
market but has superior knowledge about its own valuation. The target firm naturally knows less 
about the bidder than does the bidder itself, hence the information asymmetry. In contrast, the 
potential costs of a suboptimal capital structure are common knowledge. We will use this 
information scenario to predict the “expected payment method” using a variety of variables 
proposed by the literature. 
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We now make two types of predictions. The first concerns financing behavior; the second 
deals with long-term, post-acquisition stock price behavior. 
 
2.2. Predictions about financing behavior 
We consider four possibilities based on the combinations of two payment methods and two stock 
valuations; see Table I. Market participants use observable information to predict the choice of 
payment method; in the empirical tests, we replicate this prediction by regressing the payment 
method on firm and transaction characteristics. The acquirer, in contrast, has private information 
about its own valuation. Hence market timing considerations can either validate or refute the 
predictions, since acquirers have incentives to pay with overvalued stock and to avoid paying 
with undervalued stock. 
[[ INSERT Table I about Here ]] 
We predict that bidders are likely to pay with cash when this decision is forecast by the 
prediction model. To see why, consider the two cases of misvaluation. When cash is predicted 
and the bidder’s shares are undervalued, the market timing recommendation is consistent with 
the prediction model and so there is no reason to deviate from either. In contrast, when cash is 
predicted and the bidder’s shares are overvalued, the bidder may prefer paying with equity. 
However, such a financing proposal (against the cash prediction) will reveal to the target firm 
that the bidder is overvalued, which makes market timing impossible: the bidder is forced to 
increase the consideration and thus fails to obtain enough benefit to compensate for the cost of 
deviating from the predicted choice of financing. As a consequence, the bidder may decide to 
pay with cash or to cancel the bid. So one strong prediction we make is that no equity-financed 
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acquisitions will transpire when the fundamentals indicate that it is optimal to pay with cash. Our 
first formal hypothesis is thus as follows. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). If the prediction model recommends cash payment, then bidders will pay 
with cash. 
In cases where the model predicts that the bidder should pay with stock, bidders whose 
shares are sufficiently undervalued may well pay with cash. The reason is that a transaction price 
paid in cash is not affected by the bidder’s stock value, to which the target’s management is 
indifferent if being paid with cash. Indeed, target shareholders can even use their cash payment 
to buy the bidder’s shares. In contrast, firms for which the model predicts payment via stock will 
use equity if it is correctly valued or overvalued. In this case, the target’s management cannot 
presume that market timing has determined the acquisition financing choice and so cannot 
reasonably request additional compensation. Therefore, market timing becomes feasible when 
the bidder can “hide behind” the prediction model. This leads us to propose the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). If the prediction model recommends equity payment, then valuation motives 
may outweigh concerns about fundamentals; hence both cash- and equity-financed acquisitions 
will be observed. 
 
2.3. Predictions about long-term excess returns 
Table II summarizes our predictions on long-term excess returns. Arguments based on the trade-
off theory predict that there will be no significant long-term excess returns; that is, anything 
affecting the firm’s value will have already occurred by the time of announcement. Long-term 
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excess returns are instead an effect of market timing: we expect positive (resp. negative) long-
term returns if the firm was undervalued (resp. overvalued). 
[[ INSERT Table II about Here ]] 
In the presence of both market timing and capital structure concerns, predictions are 
different from these stylized ones described so far. Hypothesis 1 predicts that most firms pay 
with cash if they are expected to do so; this includes undervalued, correctly valued, and 
overvalued firms. Overvalued firms prefer to pay with overvalued stock, but they cannot without 
revealing to the target’s management that the stock is overvalued and thus inducing it to ask for a 
higher premium. In other words, observed cash payment in congruence with the prediction does 
not provide any additional information about valuation and so cannot predict any significant 
long-term excess returns. This notion is formalized as follows. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). If bidders pay with cash and if such payment is predicted by the model, then 
long-term excess returns will not be significantly different from zero. 
Even when the publicly available data predicts equity issuance, some heavily 
undervalued firms may want to pay with cash. If the market underreacts, we should observe 
positive long-term returns for these undervalued firms. That dynamic is captured in our next 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). If the model predicts that bidders pay with stock and if bidders instead pay 
with cash, then long-term excess returns will be positive. 
Overvalued firms that should pay with stock (according to the prediction model) have 
two reasons to issue stock: fundamentals and market timing. Therefore, such a firm can always 
cite fundamentals as justification for its choice of payment, which means that the target firm 
cannot infer the bidder’s true motivation on the basis of that choice alone. Consequently, market 
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timing is possible. We expect that some overvalued firms will use this opportunity to issue 
overvalued stock, which means that we should observe negative long-term returns after equity-
financed acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5). If bidders pay with stock in accordance with the model’s prediction, then 
long-term excess returns will be negative. 
 
3. Data 
Our sample of mergers and acquisitions is drawn from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
mergers and acquisitions database. To be included in our sample, a transaction must have been 
completed; the first announcement date must lie between 1 January 1980 and 31 December 2005; 
both acquirer and target must be US public companies; the acquirer must not operate in the 
financial or real estate sector; and at least 50% of the target must be acquired by the bidder. This 
last criterion is necessary to ensure that the acquirer consolidates the target firm’s balance sheet 
after the transaction. Accounting data come from Compustat and stock market data from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). To reduce noise created by data errors, we 
Winsorize all variables at 1% and 99% levels unless they have a natural bound (as with 
percentages). Appendix A gives an overview of all variables and their definitions. 
Taking the restrictions into account generates a sample of 2,978 acquisitions. This is 
comparable with numbers reported in the literature: Netter et al. (2011) document that 3,100 
acquisitions between 1992 and 2009 were between acquirers and targets that are both public and 
on CRSP. Our sample is more restrictive because we require certain data for both target and 
acquirer. This is because we want to predict the pro-forma balance sheet—and subsequently the 
pro-forma “optimal” leverage—as accurately as possible. Our analysis is therefore most 
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applicable for mergers between firms with high information quality, and the reader must be 
careful in extrapolating our results to acquisitions where information on the target firm is scarce 
or not available. In fact, our analysis is likely to be less relevant outside our sample, where cash 
payment is more prevalent: target firms outside the sample are often smaller and therefore have 
less impact on the subsequent capital structure, which makes cash financing easier. They are also 
often less liquid or even private, which makes them less likely to demand payment in equity.  
Our sample contains 787 cash transactions, 1,396 equity transactions, and 795 hybrid 
transactions. A summary of the statistics is given in Table III. The transactions were paid with a 
median of 82% in stock (mean of 61%) and with a median premium of 30% (mean of 38%). The 
acquirer’s median market capitalization of equity is $957 million (mean of $8,775 million). The 
target’s median market capitalization is $307 million (mean of $3,931 million), which is 
comparable to the median of $386 million reported for the sample of Hartzell et al. (2004). 
[[ INSERT Table III about Here ]] 
To compare the total size of target and acquirer firms, we compute their respective 
enterprise value as the sum of net debt and the market value of equity. The ratio of the target’s 
enterprise value divided by the buyer’s (“relative size”) has a median of 51% (mean of 62%). 
This nontrivial relative size means that the bidder cannot simply look at its own capital structure 
when deciding on the payment method; rather, it must compute pro forma post-acquisition 
(combined) leverage ratios to judge whether equity or cash payment is appropriate. Overall, 
target firms are more levered than are acquirers: targets have a median market leverage ratio of 
35% (mean of 55%) whereas acquirers have a median market leverage ratio of 22% (mean of 
41%). 
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We also report the median characteristics for the subsamples of all-cash, all-stock, and 
hybrid transactions. Of the 2,978 transactions in our sample, 1,396 (47%) were paid entirely in 
stock and 787 (26%) were paid entirely in cash. The all-cash acquisitions commanded a higher 
premium (median of 35%, versus 27% for all-stock acquisitions) but were similar in relative size 
(median of 48%, versus 52% for all-stock acquisitions). Targets of all-cash transactions are 
smaller than targets of all-stock transactions (median of $256 million, versus $315 million for 
all-stock acquisitions). The hybrid payment transaction’s characteristics are intermediate 
between those of the all-cash and all-stock transactions. 
 
4. Predicting acquisition finance 
Is acquisition finance driven by fundamental reasons, or do acquirers sometimes finance 
transactions in an unexpected way consistent with market timing? To test for these possibilities, 
we develop a prediction model for the choice of acquisition finance. As a first step, we introduce 
a measure of the equity-versus-cash payment’s contribution to an optimal capital structure. We 
then develop our prediction model using this measure and other drivers of payment methods 
proposed in the acquisition finance literature. 
 
4.1. Acquisition finance and capital structure: a measure 
In an acquisition, two independent entities—each with their own capital structure and set of 
characteristics—are combined into one single entity. This emerging firm is likely to be quite 
different from either of its predecessors. These effects would be unaccounted for if we focused 
on the effects of the acquisition financing method on pre-acquisition bidder leverage, as is 
common in the acquisition finance literature (e.g., Harford et al., 2009; Uysal, 2011). Instead, we 
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build pro forma balance sheets based on both cash and stock payment and then compare the 
pro forma leverage to the optimal leverage specified by empirical models of capital structure. 
This approach allows us to identify which financing method is expected to be better, and to what 
extent, for the resulting capital structure. Our aim here is simply to identify the expected 
financing choice from the perspective of market participants at the time of the announcement; 
that is, we advance no opinion as regards what would actually constitute an optimal capital 
structure. 
First, we follow Kayhan and Titman’s (2007) approach to predicting optimal leverage; 
see Appendix B. This cross-sectional leverage prediction model has been widely used in related 
literature as the basis for leverage prediction (e.g., Chang and Dasgupta, 2009; Harford et al., 
2009). To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we repeat the analysis with a series of 
alternative models. In essence, our measure L* of optimal leverage is estimated as the fitted 
value of a “firm characteristics” regression using all firms listed on Compustat. 
Second, we build hypothetical balance sheets for the combined firm to calculate the 
consequences of the acquisition financing choice. To estimate the combined firm’s optimal 
leverage ratio, we build its pro forma balance sheets using the methodology described in 
Appendix B. We calculate the post-acquisition leverage ratios of the combined firm conditional 
upon paying with equity, L(Equity), and upon paying with cash, L(Cash), as follows: 
 
Debt Debt(Equity) ,
Debt Debt Equity Transaction value
A T
A T A
L +=
+ + +
 (1) 
 
Debt Debt New debt issued(Cash) ;
Debt Debt Equity Transaction value
A T
A T A
L + +=
+ + +
 (2) 
here the subscripts A and T denote (respectively) acquirer and target. 
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Third, we calculate the leverage deviation as the absolute difference between L* and 
L(Cash), which we call ∆(Cash), and between L* and L(Equity), which we call ∆(Equity). 
Finally, we create a variable that compares the effects of cash and stock payment directly; this 
variable is denoted by Λ and calculated as ∆(Cash) − ∆(Equity). When Λ is positive (resp. 
negative), equity (resp. cash) payment is better for the subsequent capital structure.   
Three notes are in order. First, we calculate debt as net debt—that is, after adjusting for 
excess cash. Normal (non-excess) cash is estimated using average ratios of cash to assets in the 
acquirer industry (see Appendix B). Second, we use book values for our base-case scenario (and 
show later that our results are robust to using market values instead). Our results are robust also 
to calculating debt with or without deducting cash. Third, Λ is correlated with the relative size of 
the target: larger targets are likely to have a higher impact on the subsequent capital structure. It 
is therefore important that we control for target size in our subsequent analysis. 
 
4.2. Predicted and actual leverage 
We report statistics for our leverage predictions in Panel D of Table III. For the target–acquirer 
combinations in our sample, we obtain a predicted optimal leverage L* for the combined firm 
with a median of 39% (mean of 34%). Median pro forma leverage ratios assuming cash and 
equity payment, L(Cash) and L(Equity), are respectively 65% and 38% (mean of 64% and 37%). 
Initial confirmation that such capital structure concerns could be critical for the choice of 
acquisition finance method is that the optimal leverage L* is higher (median of 43%) for deals 
paid in cash than for deals paid in equity (median L* of 29%). 
Actual leverage after completion of the acquisition is in line with our pro forma leverage 
calculations. We report post-transaction median leverage ratios in Table IV. Acquirers who pay 
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with cash have a median book leverage of 49% (market leverage of 30%) after the acquisition 
becomes effective, compared with the pro forma book leverage ratio of 58%. Acquirers who pay 
with equity have a median book leverage of 36% (market leverage of 16%), compared with the 
pro forma ratio of 32%. In the subsequent two years, cash acquirers gradually pay down their 
debt, while equity acquirers stay on a similar level or increase their leverage. 
[[ INSERT Table IV about Here ]] 
The magnitude of the deviations from optimal leverage resulting from cash versus equity 
payment (Λ) suggests that capital structure concerns are relevant for the choice of payment 
method. The mean Λ is 5% (median of 2%). Recall that Λ denotes the extent to which the 
leverage resulting from cash payment deviates from optimal as compared with equity payment. 
A positive Λ means that, ceteris paribus, more firms should prefer equity payment. Consistently 
with this prediction, equity represents 47% and cash 26% of the acquisition payment in our 
sample. 
 
4.3. Selection to become an acquirer 
Uysal (2011) shows that deviations from optimal leverage affect the probability to become an 
acquirer. Because acquirer leverage also affects the pro-forma deviations from optimal leverage 
of the combined entity, we use a Heckman (1979) procedure to control for the selection into the 
acquirer sample. We use a specification based on Uysal’s selection estimation but with a twist: 
we argue that not only the acquirer’s leverage matters, but also the leverage of potential targets. 
On the one hand, acquirers may prefer underleveraged target firms because they have a greater 
debt capacity that allows for the financing of the transaction with cash. On the other hand, 
acquirers that deviate from optimal leverage can use target firms with the opposite deviation to 
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move closer to optimal leverage. Like Uysal, we use “leverage deficit”, the difference between 
actual and optimal leverage, to measure deviations from optimal leverage, and identify firms in 
the upper and lower quartile of the deficit as “over-“ and “underleveraged“ firms. We use the 
industry average of these measures for the availability of over- and underleveraged target firms.  
 [[ INSERT Table V about Here ]] 
We report results in Table V, with a baseline regression without interactions in column 1. 
Acquirers that deviate more from optimal leverage are significantly less likely to become 
acquirers. The coefficients on the under- and overleveraged acquirer dummies are both negative 
and significant. The availability of target firms in the same industry also affects the probability of 
becoming an acquirer significantly: firms in industries with more underleveraged firms are more 
likely to become an acquirer. We control for the average leverage in the industry, which has 
significant negative impact, consistent with the argument that higher leverage makes it harder to 
finance acquisitions. 
In column 2, we replace the acquirer leverage characteristics with interaction terms of the 
firm and industry over- and underleverage dummies. Industries with more underleveraged 
potential targets are more likely to attract underleveraged acquirers, and industries with 
overleveraged targets are less likely to do so. This suggests that acquirers do not necessarily look 
out for targets that are complimentary to them in terms of leverage deviation. On the contrary, 
underleveraged targets are generally more popular, even with underleveraged acquirers.  
Extreme leverage deviations may matter more for acquirers than potential targets. We 
replace the industry dummies with a continuous measure, the leverage deficit, in columns 3 and 
4. In column 3, we interact the deficit with the acquirer over- and underleverage dummies, and in 
column 4 with the acquirer deficit. The results are consistent with the results reported in column 
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2. Underleveraged firms are significantly more likely to become acquirers if the average industry 
leverage is below the optimal level (column 3), and the interaction of acquirer and industry 
deficit is significantly positive (column 4). We use the specification reported in column 4 to 
compute the Inverse Mills ratio to control for selection in the analysis below. 
Overall, our estimations improve upon the explanatory power, with a Pseudo-R2 in the 
range between 7.6 % and 7.9 % compared to 5.4% in Uysal (2011). This indicates that target 
leverage indeed plays a role for the decision to become an acquirer. 
   
4.4. Other Control Variables 
The Kayhan and Titman (2007) model is designed to predict capital structure in general and 
abstracts from other acquisition-specific considerations. Eckbo (2009) provides an overview of 
the acquisition finance literature. Based on this literature, we introduce a number of control 
variables that make our tests more specific to acquisition finance. 
First, tender offers and hostile transactions are typically financed with cash. This choice 
reflects the more straightforward nature of making fixed offers directly to investors. If the offer 
is in stock, the SEC registration process is more tedious slows down the speed of the offer 
process. In the meantime, the value of the bid fluctuates with the bidder’s stock price and 
possible declines makes investors more reluctant to accept the bid. In addition, rival bidders may 
emerge in the meantime. So if the bidder is interested in completing the transaction quickly and 
is worried about possible failure, it will prefer to pay with cash. Speed may be important in 
tender offers (Martin, 1996) and in hostile offers. We include indicators for both tender offers 
and hostile transactions. 
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Second, according to Hansen’s (1987) risk-sharing hypothesis, the bidder can share the 
post-acquisition performance risk with the target by paying with stock. This strategy can be 
especially beneficial when the transaction value is large. Hence we control for the size of the 
target relative to the bidder and also control for the premium. 
Third, managers and other shareholders that own a significant share of the target firm 
may want to retain control over the resulting firm and therefore prefer stock payment (Ghosh and 
Ruland, 1998). Baker et al. (2007) argue that individual investors are inert and hence more 
willing than institutional shareholders to accept acquirer stock as a form of payment. We control 
for these hypotheses by including dummy variables set equal to 1 for (respectively) insider 
ownership, institutional ownership, and block ownership amounting to more than 5% of the 
target’s stock. Another ownership related hypothesis (Gilson et al., 1988) involves tax 
considerations: if a firm pays with cash, then the selling shareholders are subject to capital gains 
taxes; if it pays with stock, then shareholders can defer their gains. To the extent that bidders 
must compensate (via a higher bid price) target shareholders for higher capital gains taxes, 
bidders will prefer stock payment. However, this tax issue is more relevant for individuals than 
for institutional shareholders; hence we predict that, when individuals (resp. institutions) own 
more shares, they will prefer stock (resp. cash). 
Fourth, the governance structure of the target firm may affect its management’s attitude 
toward the negotiation. Hartzell et al. (2004) describe governance provisions that affect target 
management’s willingness to accept acquisition offers, and Gompers et al. (2003) provide an 
index (the so-called G-index) of such provisions. In particular, classified boards will make it 
difficult for the acquirer to win a hostile bid. At the other extreme, “golden parachutes”—
management severance agreements that are triggered by a change in control—incentivize the 
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target’s management to accept takeover offers. As mentioned previously, it is typical for a hostile 
bidder to pay with cash because doing so facilitates the negotiation process. We therefore expect 
more stock offers in the acquisition of firms with a high G-index (more insulated management), 
with classified boards, and without golden parachutes. 
Fifth, target shareholders may be reluctant to accept illiquid acquirer stock. We control 
for this factor by using Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. All else equal, the likelihood of 
cash being used to finance the transaction is increasing in the illiquidity of the bidder’s stock. 
Sixth, Eckbo (2009) and Sudarsanam (1995) describe the relation between transaction 
structure characteristics and the choice of payment method. When multiple bidders participate in 
a contest, an acquirer may prefer cash payment because it facilitates the filing process. That 
being said, an acquirer that already owns some shares of the target (a so-called toehold) before 
the bid probably enjoys a smoother negotiation process and is less concerned about speed. 
Lockup periods and termination fees could also affect the need for a faster process. In order to 
test for the relevance of these characteristics, we add several dummy variables to control for the 
existence of competing bidders, toeholds, lockup periods, and termination fees. 
Seventh, maximizing shareholder value may be a low priority for some managers—
namely, those who prefer equity financing to debt financing because the latter prevents them 
from spending free cash flow on negative-NPV projects (Jensen, 1986). In particular, Harford 
(1999) shows that acquirers with excess cash are more prone to conduct value-destroying 
acquisitions. We control for agency costs by adding acquirer cash in excess of the industry 
average (normalized by assets) as an explanatory variable. Assuming that excess cash adequately 
captures agency costs, we expect that firms with excess cash will prefer equity financing. 
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Finally, macroeconomic factors (Harford, 2005) and time-specific sentiments (Zhang, 
2009) could affect the target’s willingness to accept equity as payment. To control for such 
effects, we include year fixed effects with the other control variables. 
 
4.5 Predicting acquisition finance: results 
To predict the method of payment, we regress the percentage of stock used as payment on Λ 
while controlling for all other variables that have been shown to affect the method of payment. 
The term Λ, our measure for the capital structure effect of different payment methods, is 
constructed as the difference between the deviation from optimal leverage after stock- versus 
cash-financed acquisitions. That is, if we hold everything else constant then equity payment is 
optimal if Λ > 0 and cash payment is optimal if Λ < 0. Hence there should be a positive relation 
between Λ and the percentage of stock paid. 
We find support for the hypothesis that firms view acquisition finance in terms of moving 
toward an optimal capital structure (as described by the Λ measure). Column 1 in Panel A of 
Table VI reports the coefficients for the Tobit regression of the percentage of stock paid on 
Λ and for the control variables. The coefficient for Λ is positive and is both statistically and 
economically significant: increasing Λ by one standard deviation increases the probability of 
paying with stock by 13% (z = 5.15). 
[[ INSERT Table VI about Here ]] 
Of all the control variables considered, tender offers have the greatest explanatory power. 
With all other variables set at their means, a tender offer raises the predicted probability of cash 
payment to 100% (z = −21.57). This finding is consistent with the argument that the speed 
required in tender offers motivates acquirers to pay with cash. In some specifications, bidders 
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with institutional ownership are significantly more likely to pay with cash, in line with the notion 
that such investors prefer that their shares not be diluted. Acquirers with more liquid shares are 
more likely to pay with stock—their stock is likely to be more appreciated by the target 
shareholders. Transactions involving multiple bidders are more likely to be paid in cash, 
consistent with the argument that doing so facilitates the negotiation process. Transactions with 
lockup agreements are more likely to be paid in equity; this accords with the idea that such 
clauses protect targets from large movements in the stock price (and hence in the premium). The 
coefficient on the Inverse Mills ratio is significantly negative, which suggest that the selection 
into becoming an acquirer is relevant for the choice of payment method. 
Panel B of Table VI reports the classification of our sample into anticipated cash and 
equity transactions and compares the prediction with the actual payment method. We predict a 
stock or cash payment if the Tobit model estimates a probability of 1 that the payment will be in 
stock or cash (respectively); otherwise, we predict a hybrid offer. For example, if the prediction 
is 100% stock and the actual payment method was cash, we classify the transaction as 
unpredicted cash. If the prediction is 100% cash (0% stock) and the actual payment was in cash, 
we classify the transaction as predicted cash payment. We do not report hybrid predictions or 
actual hybrid payments, for which the prediction accuracy is not binary and not the focus of this 
paper. For example, an actual cash transaction with a prediction of 45% stock classified as 
predicted hybrid transaction and therefore not reported.  We repeat the analysis as a Probit 
estimation to check that our results do not depend on assigning acquirers with a 100% 
probability of paying stock (cash) as predicted stock (cash) payers—rather than some other, less 
conservative cutoff level that would still work in a Probit model. We find little difference in the 
prediction for nonhybrid cases. 
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Overall, the Tobit specification with control variables correctly predicts the payment 
method in 89% of our sample. The Pseudo-R2 is 18.6%, an improvement compared to the 
previous literature: for example, Uysal (2011) reports a Pseudo-R2 of 13.5%.b In only 1% of the 
transactions in which the cash payment is predicted did firms pay with stock, or 12% of the 
transactions in which the prediction differs from actual payment. This means that 82% of all 
unanticipated payment decisions involve paying cash rather than following the prediction to 
issue stock. Thus the two types of deviation from the optimum financing method are highly 
asymmetrical. When the model predicts cash payment, almost all firms follow the 
recommendation. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
It is important to show that our results do not change when we control for acquirer 
overleverage, as suggested in Uysal (2011), or when we change the manner of 
constructing Λ. Column 2 of Table VI controls for acquirer overleverage in the manner 
constructed by Uysal (2011). The coefficient of the variable is not significant, and it does not 
improve the prediction power of the model. Columns 3–6 of Table VI provide robustness checks 
of our payment method regressions, using alternative methods to estimate Λ. In particular, Λ 
varies with the relative size of the transaction: it is larger for larger target firms and smaller for 
small target firms. This is because smaller target firms are less relevant for the acquirer’s capital 
structure, and therefore it is important to control for the relative size of the target among the 
control variables. In column 3, we explicitly remove this size effect from Λ by normalizing it 
                                                 
b
 The power of our test may be reduced if many firms issue shares—in a separate transaction—to refinance a cash 
offer. Of the 2,978 firms in our sample, 269 announced a secondary equity issue in the same year as the M&A 
announcement, of which 43 were classified by Dealogic as “use of proceeds for acquisitions”. Only eight of these 
transactions were made by sample firms that we classified as making cash-financed acquisitions. Discussions with 
practitioners suggest that some potential acquirers issue equity well before bidding, which would mean that we have 
already incorporated their (well-equipped) post-issuance capital structure in our analysis. 
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with relative size (in other words L(cash)-L(equity)). This reduces the effect of Λ by a factor of 5 
and decreases the accuracy of the model to a Pseudo-R2 of 18.4%, but does not change the 
baseline results. Our conclusions also do not change when we use the leverage prediction models 
of Fama and French (2002) (see column 4 of the table), when we use market values instead of 
book values of leverage (column 5), or when we do not deduct excess cash when computing 
leverage (column 6). Finally, our conclusions remain unaltered when we exclude hybrid 
transactions (column 7). For this last regression we use a Probit specification and define an 
anticipated stock (cash) transaction as one for which the predicted probability of paying stock 
(cash) exceeds 50%. Overall, the significance of the other control variables is similar across 
specifications (the results for other specifications are available upon request). 
Panel B shows that, regardless of the specification, the fraction of unanticipated stock 
payment never exceeds 4%. In fact, it is as low as 1% in all specifications that include hybrid 
transactions. When we exclude hybrid transactions (column 7) the prediction is less precise, 
which results in a greater number of unanticipated cash transactions (14%, versus 10% in the 
other specifications). These results are clearly consistent with hypotheses 1: almost no acquirer 
pays with stock if they are not expected to do so. 
 
4.6 Characteristics of transactions with unanticipated financing 
We find that very few—24 out of 2,978—firms succeed in paying with stock when they were 
expected to pay with cash. Yet we predicted to find none: if there is no apparent reason to pay 
with equity, should the decision to do so not convey to the target’s management that the acquirer 
is overvalued? And should the target management not refuse to sell unless the bidder changes its 
method of payment? 
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Table VII compares the transaction characteristics of expected and unexpected 
transactions. Panel A reports the comparison for equity transactions. Note that most of the 
univariate comparisons are not statistically different owing to the small number of unexpected 
equity bids.c If equity payment was not expected then 11.8% of bids are revised, compared with 
                                                 
c
 Given the very small sample, a more in-depth discussion of examples may be illustrative. One example is 
Johnson & Johnson’s $1.6 billion acquisition of Cordis, a manufacturer of cardiology devices. A major player in its 
own market, Cordis was still so small compared to Johnson & Johnson that it “would not even make a dent in the 
bottom line for the prosperous healthcare company” (Robin Sidel, “Cordis Reports Record Earnings, Mum of 
Takeover Bid,” Reuters, 20 October 1995). Under these circumstances, it was not obvious why Johnson & Johnson 
made a stock-swap bid rather than a cash offer. During the negotiations, the payment method was temporarily 
changed to cash—albeit at a discount ($100 per share compared to $105 in the stock bid). The management of 
Cordis resisted publicly, introduced poison pill provisions, and searched for white knights. It did so with added 
desperation when a rare acquirer candidate proved unlikely owing to antitrust concerns. In the end, the lack of other 
bidders and another increase in the bid put too much pressure on Cordis, and the deal closed at $109 a share (in 
Johnson & Johnson stock). 
Another example of an unanticipated equity transaction was May Department Store’s bid for Associated 
Dry Goods, which mirrored the negotiations between Johnson & Johnson and Cordis in many ways. Associated’s 
management publicly resisted May’s stock bid, trying to increase the price and “sweeten the merger offer to include 
cash as well as stock” (Isadore Barmash, “May Will Sell Part of Project in West,” New York Times, 12 July 1986). It 
also introduced a poison pill and searched for a white knight, and it promised a restructuring and the selling off of 
certain assets to improve shareholder value. May changed its bid to a cash tender offer (for 51% of the shares)—at a 
discount of 10% to the stock bid. The tender offer was not successful, in part because of the discount and the newly 
introduced poison pill. After a month of negotiations, the deal closed with an exchange ratio up by 15% compared to 
the initial bid. Yet in the meantime the price of May’s stock had fallen from $88 to $59, so the resulting premium 
was only marginally higher than the initial bid despite the higher exchange ratio. May did try to explain why stock 
was better than cash—namely, the firm could then use the “pooling of interests” accounting method, which in turn 
would allow it to postpone depreciating the value of Associated to its book value (Scott Kilman, Steve Weiner, 
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10.5% for expected equity bids. Unexpected equity bids are revised by an increase in the bid 
price of on average 3.3%, compared with 1.7% for expected ones. Unexpected equity bids are 
significantly more likely to be hostile: SDC classifies 11.8% of them as hostile, compared with 
0.4% for expected equity deals. Almost all (94%) of the unanticipated equity bids involve tender 
offers, whereas none of the anticipated equity transactions does. This need not mean that the 
tender offer was successful. However, almost all the bidders that unexpectedly bid with stock do 
make an offer directly to shareholders in lieu of negotiating with the target’s management. 
Multiple bidders were involved in 5.9% of unanticipated equity bids, compared with only 1.2% 
of anticipated equity bids. 
[[ INSERT Table VII about Here ]] 
These results suggest that target firms resist equity payment when the bidder cannot 
justify it on the basis of publicly available data. Whereas some bidders respond by paying cash 
or revising their bid upward, others try to circumvent managerial opposition via hostile tender 
offers. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the managers of target firms correctly 
interpret economically unjustified equity bids as signals of overvaluation and thus, in resisting 
unanticipated equity bids, are acting in the interests of long-term shareholders.d 
For comparison, we report transaction characteristics for cash transactions in Panel B. 
Much of the univariate statistics mirror the characteristics of our prediction model. Because cash 
transactions are faster to close, they are often the preferred method in difficult negotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hank Gilman, and Daniel Hertzberg, “Associated Dry Goods Expected to Seek Other Suitors or Higher May Stores 
Bid,” Wall Street Journal, 24 June 1986). This argument fared better with the general public than with the target’s 
management, however. Indeed, why should such an argument be valid for May but not for other acquirers? 
 
d
 And in their own interests, if they must agree to a lockup after the acquisition. 
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Therefore, we predict cash payment for hostile offers. This is also apparent in the univariate 
statistics: anticipated cash transactions are revised more often, more likely to be hostile, often 
tender offers and often involve multiple bidders. Note that the two subsamples of predicted stock 
transactions—unanticipated cash transactions and anticipated stock transactions—are similar in 
their characteristics. It is the subsample of unanticipated stock that stands out most, both 
compared to anticipated stock transactions and anticipated cash transactions.  
 
5. Announcement returns 
Before we move on to the long-term returns, it is interesting to have a brief look at short-term 
announcement returns. Our hypotheses on long-term returns, motivated by the findings of the 
previous literature, assume that mispricing will become evident in the long-term. However, it is 
possible that investors anticipate some of these developments. This should be reflected in 
announcement returns. In contrast to long-term returns, announcement returns should also reflect 
any direct effect of the payment method choice on firm value. In particular, if acquirers deviate 
from the payment method predicted under optimal capital structure considerations, the market 
should penalize them for the perceived suboptimal choice. 
We therefore report the results of an event study. For this purpose, we compute the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over a period of three days, starting on the day before the 
announcement and ending on the day after the announcement. CARs are calculated using the 
standard event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985), employing the market model 
with the equally weighted Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index as the market 
portfolio. The parameters of the market model are estimated over 255 trading days, ending 42 
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days before the announcement. We then regress the CAR on dummy variables that indicate the 
payment decision. 
[[ INSERT Table VIII about Here ]] 
Table VIII reports the results.  Column 1 indicates that anticipated cash payment 
generates positive and anticipated stock payment negative excess returns. This is in line with the 
previous literature which reports higher announcement returns for cash compared to equity 
transactions (for example, Andrade et al., 2001). Unanticipated cash transactions are not 
associated with significant abnormal returns. According to our hypothesis, these transactions are 
made by undervalued acquirers and therefore should be followed by positive long-term returns. 
However, these transactions are also suboptimal from a capital structure point of view: these 
acquirers chose to pay with cash although equity payment would have resulted into a better 
capital structure. These effects may offset each other. The coefficient on unanticipated stock 
payment is not significant, not surprising considering the small number of observations.  
In column 2, we add control variables commonly used in the literature, for example Uysal 
(2011). Adding the control variable removes the significance of the anticipated cash dummy: the 
difference between cash and stock payment is now primarily driven by the anticipated stock 
transactions. The other results remain similar to before. The sign of the control variables is 
comparable to the ones reported in the literature. In column 3, we increase the return window to 
41 days before and 126 days after the transaction. This only marginally alters coefficients, but 
not the significance. In columns 4 and 5, we add leverage deviations introduced by Uysal (2011) 
to the list of control variables: acquirer overleverage in column 4 and dummies for under- and 
overlevered acquirers in column 5. Controlling for these variables only marginally changes our 
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results, not surprising since these variables are important determinants of anticipation dummy 
variables. 
It may be tempting to conclude that markets always consider issuing equity worse than 
cash, regardless of the predictions of the trade-off theory. So, although target management may 
be aware of the trade-off prediction, the market may not be aware of this decision framework. 
However, this interpretation should be qualified by the fact that announcement returns reflect the 
market’s assessment of the NPV of the acquisition, and there is no reason why the NPV should 
be identical in all subgroups.  For example, the NPV of the acquisition will depend on the 
relative bargaining power of bidder and target (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009; Boone and 
Mulherin, 2008) and managerial motives for the acquisition (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; 
Roll, 1986). Negative announcement returns in equity financed acquisitions could also be the 
result of the fact that arbitrageurs tend to short the bidder’s stock short, as shown by Mitchell, 
Pulvino and Stafford (2004). It is therefore important that we also discuss the long-term post-
acquisition returns. 
 
6. Long-term post-acquisition returns 
If bidders deviate from the predicted financing method because of market timing considerations 
then we expect that, at least in some subsamples, bidders will experience long-term significant 
abnormal returns. In this sense, the market timing theory is a behavioral theory: it assumes that 
markets may underreact to company-specific events such as acquisitions. 
We employ the “returns across time and securities” (RATS) methodology proposed by 
Ibbotson (1975) while assuming that normal returns are generated by the Fama and French 
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(1993) three-factor model. Specifically, we run the following regression for every month j 
relative to the event month 0 ( j = 1, …, 24): 
titjtjtftmjjtfti HMLdSMBcRRbaRR ,,,,, )()( ε+++−+=− ,  (3) 
Here Ri, t is the monthly return on security i in month t; Rf, t and Rm, t are (respectively) the risk-
free rate and the return on the equally weighted CRSP index; and SMBt and HMLt are the month-
t return on size and book-to-market factor, respectively. The numbers reported are sums of the 
intercepts of cross-sectional regressions over the relevant event time periods. The advantage of 
this methodology is that it takes into account changes in the stock’s riskiness both before and 
after the acquisition—a consequence of the post-acquisition factor loadings being allowed to 
change from month to month. 
[[ INSERT Table IX about Here ]] 
Panel A of Table IX reports the long-term abnormal returns for the bidder 24 months 
after the announcement month. Figure 1 shows the cumulative abnormal returns during that 
period for the subsamples of unpredicted cash payers, predicted cash payers, and predicted stock 
payers. (We omit unpredicted equity transactions because the small number of observations 
induces too much fluctuation in the graph.) When bidders follow the model prediction and pay 
with cash, long-term abnormal returns are −1.78% (t = −0.67) after 24 months; as expected, this 
value is not significantly different from zero. Some bidders may be undervalued and others 
overvalued, but on average there is no reason to conclude that managers are timing the market. If 
the bidder is overvalued then it cannot issue stock because choosing that mode of payment will 
reveal the overvaluation. Hence it is preferable to follow the prediction and pay with cash. 
[[ INSERT Figure 1 about Here ]] 
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However, when bidders were expected to pay with stock, but decided to pay with cash 
(unanticipated cash payers), it must be that they believed that their stock was undervalued. The 
significant 24-month post-announcement return of 8.42% (t = 3.67) is consistent with this 
hypothesis. Finally, when bidders pay with stock and were expected to do so, 24-month post-
acquisition abnormal returns are −13.23% (t = −8.98); this finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis that overvalued firms can time the market successfully—even when seeking to 
acquire a sophisticated target—if their payment choice can be justified via publicly available 
data.  
As an additional test we implement the Fama and French (1993) calendar-time portfolio 
approach as advocated by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). The results when 
employing this approach are given in Panel B of Table IX. Much as with the RATS method, we 
find significantly positive long-term returns for unpredicted cash payers of 11.10% (t = 2.72). 
Predicted cash payers have significantly positive returns of 3.18% (t = 2.13) after 12 months, but 
they fall to −0.15% after 24 months (t = 0.73). For anticipated stock payers we find significantly 
negative abnormal returns of −7.54% (t = −2.13). Overall, the calendar-time approach confirms 
our findings from the RATS approach. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the extent to which acquisition finance can be explained by market 
timing or by fundamental reasons proposed in the literature on capital structure and acquisition 
finance. 
Consistently with the literature, we find that in 89% of the transactions acquirers make 
financing decisions that can be explained by various prediction models. Even so, some acquirers 
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deviate from the payment method predicted by such models. These deviations are not symmetric: 
whereas many predicted stock payers deviate by paying cash, hardly any predicted cash payers 
deviate by paying stock—and, when they do, their bids are often hostile and usually fail. This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the target firm’s management identifies stock-
paying deviators as overvalued. Hence overvalued bidders are unable to compensate for the cost 
of deviating from the model prediction by paying with overvalued stock, although they might 
take advantage of their overvaluation by (falsely) claiming that their choice of payment method 
is driven by fundamental economic motives. 
Long-term abnormal returns after the announcement provide further support for the 
influence of both trade-off and market timing arguments. In the two years after the 
announcement of unpredicted cash payment, abnormal returns are significantly positive; this 
finding supports the view that these acquirers were undervalued and thus chose to deviate from 
the trade-off model. Long-term abnormal returns are not positive after the announcement of 
predicted cash payment, however. Finally, abnormal returns are significantly negative for 
anticipated stock payers—in line with our hypothesis that heavily overvalued firms in this group 
attempt to hide behind explaining stock issuance in terms of economic fundamentals. 
Our principal conclusion is that market timing is possible in an acquisition context if it is 
driven by fundamental economic motives. Further research should examine whether this 
conclusion holds also for other events that change a firm’s capital structure. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
AMIHUD ILLIQUIDITY Amihud is for acquirer i during quarter t is defined as:  
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  Here, Rid is the return of stock i during day d, dvid is its dollar 
volume in millions of dollars (number of shares traded 
during day d times the stock price at the end of day d) and 
Mit is the number of valid observations during quarter t. Ct-1 
is the total market capitalization at t-1 divided by the total 
market capitalization at the end of July 1962. This variable is 
Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
CLASSIFIED BOARDS ...equals one if the target firm’s boards of directors is 
divided, for the purpose of election, into separate classes and 
zero otherwise. 
DEFICIT Difference between actual and predicted leverage. 
DIVERSIFYING 
…equals one if acquirer and target are in different industries. 
EXCESS CASH Value of the sum of acquirer and target cash in excess of the 
industry average. 
GOLDEN PARACHUTES ...equals one if the target firm has a severance agreement 
with its executives contingent upon a change in corporate 
control and zero otherwise.  
GOVERNANCE The index by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) measured 
for the target firm. 
HERFINDAHL Herfindahl index. 
HOSTILE … equals one if the board officially rejects the offer but the 
acquirer persists with the takeover and zero otherwise.  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP … equals one if more than 5% of the target firm’s shares are 
held by insiders who have to file the SEC forms 3, 4, 5 or 
144, as reported by Thomson Reuters.  
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP Fraction of target firm ownership by institutions who file the 
SEC form 13F.  
Λ (LAMBDA) Difference between predicted and optimal leverage assuming 
cash payment minus the difference between predicted and 
optimal leverage assuming equity payment, |L(cash) – L*| - 
|L(equity) – L*|.  
LEVERAGE …equals net debt over assets in the year prior to the 
announcement. Net debt is calculated as the sum of current 
liabilities and long-term debt minus cash above the industry 
average level (normalized by assets). If current liabilities or 
long-term debt are not available, net debt is calculated as 
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total debt less other liabilities, deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit, and cash. Both nominator and denominator are 
Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
LN SALES Natural logarithm of sales. Sales is Winsorized at 1% and 
99% levels. 
LN ASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets. Assets is Winsorized at 1% 
and 99% levels. 
LOCKUP ...equals one if the transaction includes a lockup agreement 
and zero otherwise.  
MARKET/BOOK (Market value of equity + book value of assets – book value 
of equity)/book value of assets. This variable is Winsorized 
at 1% and 99% levels. 
MARKET CAP ($) The average of the closing prices 42-30 days prior to the 
announcement times the number of shares outstanding. This 
variable is Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
MARKET LEVERAGE Book net debt divided by the average market value of assets 
42-30 days prior to the announcement. Net debt is calculated 
as the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt minus 
cash above the industry average level (normalized by assets). 
If current liabilities or long-term debt are not available, net 
debt is calculated as total debt less other liabilities, deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit, and cash. Both nominator 
and denominator are Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
MULTIPLE BIDDERS ...equals one if other bidders also seek to acquire the target 
firm and zero otherwise.  
OVERLEVERED …equals one if deficit is in the highest quartile. 
NET DEBT Sum of current liabilities and long-term debt minus cash 
above the industry average level (normalized by assets). If 
current liabilities or long-term debt are not available, net debt 
is calculated as total debt less other liabilities, deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit, and cash. This variable is 
Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
PREMIUM Transaction value less the average of the target’s market 
value four weeks prior to announcement divided by the 
latter.This variable is Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
R&D/SALES  Research and development expense divided by sales. Both 
nominator and denominator are Winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. 
R&D DUMMY ...equals one if the firm has R&D expense and zero 
otherwise. 
RELATIVE SIZE Average of the target’s enterprise values 42-30 days prior to 
announcement divided by the acquirer’s enterprise value. 
Both nominator and denominator are Winsorized at 1% and 
99% levels. 
REVISION 
...equals one if the percentage change from the final price 
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paid per share to the initial price offered per share equals 
zero. 
REVISION BY (%) Average revision in percent of the total transaction value.  
ROA Return on assets. This variable is Winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. 
RUNUP 
 
Cumulated abnormal returns 42-30 days prior to the 
announcement. This variable is Winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. 
SGA/SALES Sales and general administrative expenses divided by sales. 
Both nominator and denominator are Winsorized at 1% and 
99% levels. 
STOCK PAID Reported percentage of equity in payment according to SDC. 
STOCK RETURNS Annual stock returns, Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
TANGIBILITY Property, plant, and equipment divided by sales. Both 
nominator and denominator are Winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. 
TAXSHIELD Depreciation and amortization over total assets. Both 
nominator and denominator are Winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. 
TENDER OFFER …equals one when a tender offer is launched for the target 
and zero otherwise. A tender offer is a formal offer of 
determined duration to acquire a public company's shares 
made to equity holders.  
TERMINATION ...equals one if the transaction includes a termination 
agreement and zero otherwise.  
TOEHOLD ...equals one if the acquirer owns more than 0.5% of the 
target prior to the transaction, and zero otherwise. 
TOTAL ASSETS Book value of the firm (in million US dollars). This variable 
is Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
TRANSACTION VALUE The total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, 
excluding fees and expenses, in million US$. The dollar 
value includes the amount paid for all common stock, 
common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, 
assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six months 
of the announcement date of the transaction. Liabilities 
assumed are included in the value if they are publicly 
disclosed. Preferred stock is only included if it is being 
acquired as part of a 100% acquisition. If a portion of the 
consideration paid by the acquirer is common stock, the 
stock is valued using the closing price on the last full trading 
day prior to the announcement of the terms of the stock 
swap. If the exchange ratio of shares offered changes, the 
stock is valued based on its closing price on the last full 
trading date prior to the date of the exchange ratio change. 
This variable is Winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
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UNDERLEVERED  …equals one if deficit is in the lowest quartile. 
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Appendix B. Leverage prediction 
We adopt the methodology of Kayhan and Titman (2007) to predict leverage, and we check for 
robustness using the methodology of Fama and French (2002). The cited literature constructs a 
proxy for an “optimal” leverage ratio as the predicted value from a regression of debt ratios on 
variables shown to be relevant for leverage. Our dependent variable, the leverage ratio, is based 
on net debt adjusted for operating cash. Because the literature uses both debt including non-
operating cash and debt excluding all cash, we run our regressions for each measure. In the 
following paragraphs we describe the independent variables. 
Profitability. As Graham (2000) points out, firms that are more profitable pay more taxes 
and so benefit more from debt tax shields. This seems at odds with the empirically documented 
negative relation between between profitability and leverage (as reported, e.g., in Friend and 
Hasbrouck, 1988; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Such a negative relation can be explained by 
profitable firms using retained earnings to finance new projects because they need not issue debt 
(Kayhan and Titman, 2007). A strategic argument, as discussed by Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990), suggests that a more profitable firm prefers low leverage ratios because they deter the 
entry of potential rivals. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that the negative relation is consistent 
with a “pecking order” theory whereby firms prefer internal to external funds. Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) and Strebulaev (2007) demonstrate that the negative relation is consistent with adjustment 
costs: firms that become profitable can adjust their leverage only with some delay; meanwhile 
the increasing profitability increases firm value, which in turn reduces leverage. 
Investment opportunities. Myers (1977) argues that firms with larger growth and 
investment opportunities should avoid debt because their expected costs of financial distress are 
relatively higher. We include the market-to-book ratio and also the R&D expense (as a ratio of 
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sales) to proxy for growth and investment—as suggested, for example, by Long and Malitz 
(1985) and Bradley et al. (1988). Because R&D expenses are not reported by all firms, we 
include a dummy variable to indicate when they are available. 
Potential collateral value. Firms offering more collateral have easier and cheaper access 
to debt and so are expected to have higher leverage. As others have explained (see Long and 
Malitz, 1985; Titman and Wessels, 1988), such collateral is more valuable the higher is the value 
of tangible assets, total assets, and sales and the lower is the advertising (or selling) cost as a 
fraction of sales: the former factors can themselves serve as collateral, and the latter makes the 
firm’s assets more unique (or less deployable for banks). Uniqueness is also associated with the 
market-to-book ratio and R&D expenses. 
Tax shields. Firms may be able to forgo interest tax shields if they can instead use 
depreciation deductions to save taxes. Following Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), we use the ratio of depreciation and amortization over book assets as a proxy for 
tax shields other than leverage for their respective specifications. 
Firm size. Larger firms should have more debt capacity (Long and Malitz, 1985; Titman 
and Wessels, 1988). 
Year effects and Fama–French industry fixed effects. These variables account for, inter 
alia, the time-varying cost of debt, market preferences for leverage, and economic conditions. 
The Fama–French industry classification is coarser than the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) system, which allows us to avoid some industry measurement problems (as identified by 
Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). 
The results given in Table A1 are consistent with those reported in the previous literature. 
In particular, leverage is significantly negatively related to proxies for growth opportunities (e.g., 
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market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditures) and positively related to the importance of tangible 
assets. Return on assets—a measure of profitability—is negatively related to leverage, which 
goes against the prediction that profitable firms pay more taxes and therefore issue more debt. 
However, the negative association we find is consistent with the pecking order theory (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984): highly profitable firms prefer internal to external finance. Strebulaev (2007) 
shows that this preference is in accordance with the dynamic trade-off theory with adjustment 
costs: if leverage cannot be increased instantaneously, then an increase in profitability will raise 
the firm’s value and thus lower its leverage. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) suggest that a more 
profitable firm prefers low leverage ratios because they deter the entry of potential rivals.  
[[ INSERT Table A1 about Here ]] 
Moreover, in the leverage regression there is a negative coefficient for selling expenses. 
These expenses are also associated with more unique products, which are less suitable as 
collateral and are therefore associated with lower leverage levels. Sales and total assets are 
positively correlated with leverage, which is consistent with the argument that larger firms have 
more debt capacity. The coefficient for depreciation is positive, against the conjecture that it may 
serve as an alternative tax shield to debt. Fama and French (2002) also document positive 
coefficients for depreciation (and negative coefficients, too, with a different sample); they 
remark that depreciation is a poor proxy for tax shields. Our results are not significantly different 
when calculating debt net of all cash versus not deducting cash at all. 
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Appendix C. Pro forma balance sheets 
We illustrate the methodology used for the pro forma balance sheets with the following example. 
On 11 November 2005, the media company McClatchy announced its takeover of Knight 
Ridder, the second-largest newspaper publisher at that time. Although Knight Ridder had been 
publicly searching for a potential buyer, McClatchy’s interest was surprising: not only was 
McClatchy viewed as being too risk averse for takeovers on that scale, it was also half the size of 
Knight Ridder (Lieberman 2006). 
 
Calculating pro forma variables: Example of McClatchy–Knight Ridder transaction 
Variable Bidder Target
(in $ millions) (McClatchy) (Knight Ridder)
Debt 656            2,751           
Book equity 1,216         1,447           1,216+4,572 = 5,788      1,216      
Book assets 1,872         4,198           
Cash 3                24                
Non-operating cash 0 0 max (27 - 9% * 9,195; 0) = 0 max (27 - 9% * 9,195; 0)= 0
Market value equity 1,323         4,279           1,323+4,572 = 5,895      1,323      
Transaction value 4,572           
Net debt 656            2,751           656+2,751 = 3,407      656+2,751+4,572 = 7,979      
Book value of assets 1,872         4,198           1,872+2,751+4,572 = 9,195      9,195      
Enterprise value 1,979         7,030           1,979+2,751+4,572= 9,302      9,302      
Leverage 35% 66% 3,407/9,195 = 37% 7,979/9,195 = 87%
Market leverage 50% 64% 3,407/9,302 = 37% 7,979/9,302 = 86%
Pro forma assuming payment with...
Equity Cash
 
 
 
We begin by describing how leverage is calculated. Both firms are in the “printing and 
publishing” industry (Fama–French industry 8), which has an average cash-to-assets ratio of 9%. 
This means that neither McClatchy nor Knight Ridder has much non-operating cash, and their 
leverage is simply debt over assets (i.e., debt over enterprise value). 
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For the pro forma sums, we assume that the bidder (McClatchy) seeks to acquire the 
target (Knight Ridder) using either 100% cash or 100% equity. Let us consider the effect of each 
payment method, first on the bidder and then on the target. The value of the bid (i.e., the amount 
of value paid for the target) is represented by the transaction value—here, $4,572 million. 
If the bidder pays with equity, then it will fund the transaction value through the 
exchange of its own shares to acquire the target. The result will be an increase in both the book 
value and the market value of McClatchy stock by exactly the amount of the transaction value. 
When the balance sheets of the two companies are combined (or “consolidated”) upon 
acquisition, the target’s equity is replaced with the bidder’s equity payment. The bidder must 
likewise take on the acquired target’s debt. In this example, the target’s capital structure features 
a large amount (66%) of debt; hence the bid generates a post-acquisition book leverage ratio that 
is higher than the bidder’s pre-acquisition leverage. 
Suppose instead that the bidder chooses to pay for the acquisition with cash. In this case, 
the bidder must first raise debt in order to finance the purchase and then also assume the target 
firm’s debt. This dynamicis reflected in the significant additional debt held by the combined 
entity and the reduction in the target’s equity by the amount of the transaction value—thus, its 
shareholders have been “bought out”. An important effect of such transactions is on the leverage 
structure of the combined entity: its debt as a share of total book value rises to 87% in book 
terms or 86% in market terms (as compared with 35% and 50%, respectively, for the pre-
acquisition bidding firm). 
In reality, McClatchy paid a mix of cash and stock. It financed the cash payment by 
raising bank debt, and it announced plans to reduce the resulting high debt level by selling more 
than a third of Knight Ridder’s 32 newspapers. 
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Table I. Predictions for the choice of payment method 
 
Optimal financing predicted 
with public information 
Private information about 
acquirer valuation 
Payment method 
prediction 
Cash Undervalued Cash 
Cash Overvalued Cash 
Equity Undervalued Cash or Equity 
Equity Overvalued Equity 
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Table II. Predictions for long-term announcement returns 
 
Payment method Return prediction 
Predicted Actual Trade-off Market timing Combined 
Cash Cash 0 + 0 
Cash Equity 0 − − 
Equity Cash 0 + + 
Equity Equity 0 − − 
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Table III. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A gives transaction characteristics, while Panels B and C report 
(respectively) acquirer and target characteristics. Panel D reports statistics for leverage ratios and Λ (Lambda), 
where L* is the predicted leverage for the combined firm as calculated using the methodology described in 
Appendix A. The terms L(Cash) and L(Equity) are the pro forma leverage ratios of the combined firm if we assume, 
respectively, cash and equity payment. Lambda is the difference between predicted and optimal leverage assuming 
cash payment minus the difference between predicted and optimal leverage assuming equity payment: 
|L(Cash) − L*| − |L(Equity) − L*|.  
 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. Cash Equity Hybrid
STOCK PAID 61% 82% 43% 0% 100% 0% 100% 53%
PREMIUM  (%) 38 30 43 -50 229 35 27 28
RELATIVE SIZE 62% 51% 42% 5% 117% 48% 52% 53%
LEVERAGE 45% 40% 34% -40% 100% 32% 53% 42%
MARKET LEVERAGE 41% 22% 54% -45% 100% 17% 34% 23%
MARKET/BOOK 2.91 1.42 4.91 0.57 39.20 1.56 1.27 1.47
MARKET CAP  (m US$) 8,775 957 12,405 166 38,611 1,290 865 953
TOTAL ASSETS  (m US$) 9,261 1,484 23,453 5 165,493 1,668 1,466 1,410
LEVERAGE 48% 44% 33% -40% 100% 35% 55% 50%
MARKET LEVERAGE 55% 35% 103% -103% 100% 24% 40% 37%
MARKET/BOOK 2.54 1.19 5.52 0.30 46.53 1.30 1.13 1.23
MARKET CAP  (m US$) 3,931 307 5,653 48 17,039 256 315 347
TOTAL ASSETS  (m US$) 6,674 612 20,414 4 151,067 468 624 737
L* 34.0% 39.3% 18.3% -6.0% 71.5% 43% 29% 44%
L(Cash) 63.7% 65.2% 18.5% 32.2% 90.1% 58% 69% 69%
L(Equity) 36.6% 38.3% 19.9% 3.8% 65.6% 44% 32% 39%
LAMBDA 4.9% 2.3% 15.2% -41.9% 83.0% 2% 2% 5%
Observations 787 1,396 795
Panel D: Leverage ratios and Lambdas
Panel C: Target characteristics
Panel A: Transaction characteristics
Panel B: Acquirer characteristics
All transactions Subsample median
2,978
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Table IV: Post-acquisition leverage development 
This table reports the median leverage ratio in the three years after the acquisition becomes effective. 
 
L(Cash) L(Equity) L*
Year relative to effective year 0 1 2 0 1 2
ALL 44.4% 43.2% 43.0% 26.9% 24.7% 26.6% 65% 38% 39%
CASH 48.9% 46.1% 44.6% 30.1% 29.8% 28.6% 58% 44% 43%
EQUITY 36.0% 36.3% 36.5% 16.3% 16.7% 19.4% 69% 32% 29%
HYBRID 50.0% 46.8% 46.7% 34.5% 34.0% 34.1% 69% 39% 44%
Predicted leverageMedian post-acquisition leverage
Book values Market values
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Table V. Predicting acquisitions 
This table shows the results for prediction of the acquisition decision. All columns report Probit regressions in which 
the dependent variable equals 1 if a firm undertakes an acquisition in that year. The Table reports coefficients and z-
statistics for the regression (adjusted for standard errors clustered by firm and year) as well as the number of 
observations. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Firm Industry (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm leverage UNDERLEVERAGED -0.16 *** -0.17 ***
(-5.35) (-5.43)
OVERLEVERAGED -0.15 *** -0.15 ***
(-4.43) (-4.57)
DEFICIT -0.01
(-0.24)
Industry leverage UNDERLEVERAGED 0.01 *** 0.00 **
(3.37) (1.97)
OVERLEVERAGED 0.00 0.00
(0.2) (1.57)
DEFICIT -0.17 -0.30
(-0.7) (-1.45)
AVERAGE LEVERAGE -0.40 ** -0.41 ** -0.40 * -0.41 *
(-2.07) (-2.12) (-1.76) (-1.81)
Interactions UNDERLEVERAGED x OVERLEVERAGED -0.02 ***
(-3.95)
OVERLEVERAGED x UNDERLEVERAGED 0.00
(-0.78)
UNDERLEVERAGED x UNDERLEVERAGED 0.01 ***
(3.04)
OVERLEVERAGED x OVERLEVERAGED 0.00
(-0.6)
UNDERLEVERAGED x DEFICIT -0.81 **
(-2.54)
OVERLEVERAGED x DEFICIT 0.25
(0.75)
DEFICIT x DEFICIT 1.08 **
(2.15)
Firm characteristics SALES 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(8.4) (8.66) (8.4) (9)
STOCK RETURNS 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 ***
(6.91) (7.14) (6.82) (7.4)
MARKET/BOOK 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.4) (0.54) (0.37) (0.83)
ROA 0.41 *** 0.44 *** 0.40 *** 0.47 ***
(5.69) (5.99) (5.53) (6.42)
Industry characteristics MERGER # -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.16 *** -0.16 ***
(-4.85) (-4.85) (-4.96) (-4.97)
HERFINDAHL -0.95 *** -0.97 *** -1.37 *** -1.35 ***
(-2.85) (-2.91) (-4.41) (-4.36)
INTERCEPT -2.52 *** -2.45 *** -2.53 ***
(-10.58) (-10.05) (-10.4)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 7.87 7.78 7.86 7.57
Observations 41,530    41,530    41,530    41,530    
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Table VI. Payment method prediction 
This table shows the results for prediction of the payment method. All columns (except for column 7, which 
excludes hybrid transactions) report Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the percentage of stock 
used as payment; in column 7, we use a Probit regression in which the dependent variable equals 1 for pure stock 
payment and 0 for pure cash payment. Panel A reports coefficients and z-statistics for the regression as well as the 
number of observations. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B reports the fraction of anticipated and unanticipated cash and equity transactions. For the Probit 
specification in column 7, we classify a prediction as cash (stock) if the predicted probability of using the observed 
payment method exceeds 50%. For the Tobit specifications, we classify a prediction according to the predicted 
percentage of stock. Predictions for hybrid transactions are omitted. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Main Acquirer overleverage Relative Lambda Fama-French Market values Gross debt Excl. hybrids
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit
LAMBDA 0.83 *** 0.78 *** 0.15 *** 0.49 *** 0.52 *** 0.94 *** 1.39 ***
                                   (5.15) (4.35) (4.12) (5.82) (6.34) (5.73) (5.43)
ACQUIRER OVERLEVERAGE 0.06
(0.59)
TENDER OFFER -1.74 *** -1.74 *** -1.74 *** -1.70 *** -1.67 *** -1.73 *** -2.63 ***
                                   (-21.57) (-21.57) (-21.48) (-21.12) (-20.79) (-20.96) (-18.78)
HOSTILE -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.07 -0.17 0.49
                                   (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.29) (-0.65) (-0.36) (-0.81) (1.35)
PREMIUM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
                                   (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.69) (-0.55) (-0.46) (-0.97) (-1.85)
RELATIVE SIZE 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.07
                                   (0.68) (0.7) (0.38) (0.02) (-0.69) (0.01) (0.76)
INSIDER OWNED 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 -0.01
(1.2) (1.19) (0.77) (1.52) (1.06) (1.42) (-0.15)
INSTITUTIONAL O. -0.11 ** -0.10 ** -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 ** -0.03
(-2.08) (-2.02) (-1.45) (-1.29) (-0.75) (-2.15) (-0.4)
BLOCKHOLDERS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 *
(0) (0.02) (0.38) (0.44) (0.64) (-0.06) (1.71)
G-INDEX 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
(1.34) (1.32) (1.41) (1.55) (1.25) (0.99) (1.58)
CLASSIFIED BOARD -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 * -0.22 * -0.17 -0.25
(-1.45) (-1.44) (-1.56) (-1.72) (-1.7) (-1.33) (-1.28)
GOLDEN PARACHUTE -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.30
(-0.66) (-0.65) (-0.74) (-0.85) (-0.66) (-0.37) (-1.58)
ACQUIRER ILLIQUIDITY -0.39 ** -0.40 ** -0.41 ** -0.46 *** -0.43 ** -0.41 ** -0.72 ***
(-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.36) (-2.65) (-2.49) (-2.41) (-2.8)
MULTIPLE BIDDERS -0.36 ** -0.36 * -0.35 * -0.35 * -0.35 * -0.31 * -0.65 **
(-1.97) (-1.96) (-1.93) (-1.94) (-1.94) (-1.69) (-2.23)
TOEHOLD -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.21
(-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.5) (-0.43) (-0.32) (-0.01) (-0.79)
LOCKUP 0.46 *** 0.46 *** 0.44 *** 0.42 *** 0.37 *** 0.45 *** 0.58 ***
(4.73) (4.66) (4.52) (4.24) (3.73) (4.57) (3.56)
TERMINATION FEES 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.19 **
(0.65) (0.67) (1) (1.36) (1.31) (0.11) (2.02)
EXCESS CASH 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.82) (0.88) (0.76) (0.8) (0.54) (1.12) (0.58)
MILLS -0.39 *** -0.39 *** -0.33 *** -0.31 *** -0.22 *** -0.45 *** -0.43 ***
(-5.02) (-4.98) (-4.19) (-3.94) (-2.7) (-5.68) (-3.76)
INTERCEPT 0.49 *** 0.49 *** 0.43 *** 0.36 *** 0.29 ** 0.47 *** 0.24
(3.91) (3.96) (3.42) (2.86) (2.27) (3.8) (0.68)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,183
Prediction Actual
CASH CASH 23% 22% 22% 22% 22% 21% 22%
STOCK STOCK 66% 66% 66% 67% 67% 68% 60%
STOCK CASH 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 14%
CASH STOCK 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 4%
Pseudo R-Squared 18.58        18.59        18.42        18.71        18.82        18.60        38.33        
Panel A: Main regression (dependent variable = percentage of equity used in payment)
Panel B: Predicted and realized payment method
 
  50
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII. Descriptive statistics by prediction 
This table reports means for the characteristics of transactions grouped by predicted outcome. The values given are 
the means and the t-statistics for when the means differ. 
 
Anticipated 
Stock
Unanticipated 
Stock t -statistic
REVISION 10.6% 13.6% (0.45)
…BY  (%) 2.06      2.19          (0.01)
HOSTILE 0.4% 9.1% (5.48) ***
TENDEROFFER 0.0% 72.7% (52.76) ***
MULTIPLE BIDDERS 1.2% 4.5% (1.35)
Observations 1,450    30             
Anticipated 
Cash
Unanticipated 
Cash t -statistic
REVISION 10.8% 4.5% (-2.32) **
…BY  (%) 15.23 4.90 (-1.25)
HOSTILE 8.3% 0.0% (-3.74) ***
TENDEROFFER 67.5% 0.0% (-120) ***
MULTIPLE BIDDERS 12.0% 3.8% (-2.9) ***
Observations 486       216           
Panel A: Average transaction characteristics by prediction - Stock
Panel B: Average transaction characteristics by prediction - Cash
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Table VIII. Acquirer announcement returns 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is cumulative announcement returns 
for the acquirer. The returns are estimated for a three-day-window around the announcement date in all but column 
3. In column 3, the returns are estimated for 41 days before up to 126 days after the transaction. The table reports 
coefficients and t-statistics for the regression as well as the number of observations.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Window (-1,1) (-1,1) (-41,126) (-1,1) (-1,1)
ANTICIPATED CASH 0.008 ** 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
(2.05) (0.65) (0.48) (0.62) (0.6)
ANTICIPATED STOCK -0.02 *** -0.015 *** -0.012 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
(-9.71) (-4.12) (-3.32) (-3.84) (-3.84)
UNANTICIPATED CASH 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.33) (0.47) (0.26) (0.57) (0.57)
UNANTICIPATED STOCK -0.02 -0.018 -0.021 -0.018 -0.019
(-1.4) (-1.24) (-1.44) (-1.25) (-1.27)
ACQUIRER DEFICIT -0.008
(-1.49)
UNDERLEVERED ACQUIRER 0.006 *
(1.8)
OVERLEVERED ACQUIRER 0
(0.02)
TENDER OFFER 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
(1.27) (1.34) (1.3) (1.29)
RELATIVE SIZE -0.019 *** -0.018 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(-8.78) (-8.02) (-8.84) (-8.87)
HOSTILE 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.015
(1.26) (1.05) (1.29) (1.3)
DIVERSIFYING -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-1.28) (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.22)
ACQUIRER LN SALES -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(-4.37) (-4.41) (-4.27) (-3.99)
ACQUIRER LEVERAGE 0.012 0.011 0.015 * 0.013 *
(1.61) (1.57) (1.95) (1.73)
ACQUIRER MARKET/BOOK 0 0 0 0
(-0.19) (-0.71) (0.15) (-0.01)
ACQUIRER ROA 0.009 0.022 * 0.008 0.007
(0.7) (1.74) (0.61) (0.59)
ACQUIRER RUNUP 0.008 * 0.001 0.008 * 0.015
(1.91) (0.37) (1.93) (1.26)
HERFINDAHL -0.018 -0.024 -0.02 -0.022
(-0.84) (-1.13) (-0.96) (-1)
YEAR F.E. YES YES YES YES
R-SQUARED 3.7 9.3 8.4 9.3 9.31
N 2,546    2,546    2,381    2,546    2,546    
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Table IX. Post-acquisition long-run abnormal returns 
This table reports cumulative long-run abnormal returns for the merged firms—at 6, 12, and 24 months after the 
announcement month—for the subsamples of acquirers who paid with cash or stock and were (respectively) 
predicted or not predicted to do so. The subsample of unpredicted stock payers is suppressed owing to the limited 
number of observations. Panel A reports returns calculated using the Ibbotson (1975) returns across time and 
securities (RATS) method as well are returns calculated using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. See 
the text for details. Reported values are sums of the intercepts of cross-sectional regressions over the relevant event 
time periods; the standard error for a window is the square root of the sum of the squares of the monthly standard 
error. 
Panel B reports monthly average announcement returns of equally weighted calendar-time portfolios using 
the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model. In this model, acquirers who have announced an acquisition in the past 
6 (12, 24) calendar months form the basis of the calendar-time portfolio. A single time-series regression is run with 
the excess return of the calendar portfolio as the dependent variable and the return on the three factors as the 
independent variables (the excess market return, the book-to-market and size factors). The table reports means (and 
t-statistics if the means are different from zero). 
 
Prediction Actual (1,6) (1,12) (1,24) (1,6) (1,12) (1,24)
CASH CASH 2.49% 4.54% ** 2.90% 2.16% 3.00% * -0.52%
(1.51) (1.98) (0.9) (1.25) (1.9) (0.53)
STOCK STOCK 0.90% 0.09% -4.41% * 0.39% -0.88% -7.10% *
(0.87) (0.06) (-1.94) (0.11) (-0.21) (-1.77)
STOCK CASH 5.77% *** 12.52% *** 24.48% *** 3.22% * 8.47% *** 16.19% ***
(2.65) (3.79) (5.07) (1.81) (3.08) (3.84)
CASH STOCK NA NA
Payment method  Panel A: Ibbotson RATS 
(in months) 
 Panel B: Calender-time 
(in months) 
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Table A1. Predicting leverage 
This table reports coefficients and (in parentheses) the corresponding statistics used for leverage ratio prediction. 
The reported numbers are derived using a Tobit specification in which the predicted value of the leverage ratio is 
restricted to be below 1. Columns 1, 2, and 5–8 show regression results based on the specification used in Kayhan 
and Titman (2007); columns 3 and 4 show regression results based on the specification used in Fama and French 
(2002). Columns 1–4 give results based on leverage for when debt is net of cash above the industry average level 
(normalized by assets); columns 5 and 6 are based on leverage calculated with total debt; and columns 7 and 8 are 
based on leverage net of all cash. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 use book values whereas and columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 use 
market values. The sample consists of all firms listed in Compustat between 1979 and 2005. All independent 
variables are from the year prior to observation of the dependent variable. The statistics for year and industry 
dummies are suppressed. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Book Market Book Market Book Market Book Market
ROA -0.40 *** -0.42 *** -0.15 *** -0.11 *** -0.38 *** -0.44 *** -0.54 *** -0.49 ***
(-40.63) (-43.18) (-19.08) (-14.8) (-43.52) (-47.54) (-48.44) (-44.42)
MARKET/BOOK -0.01 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.05 *** -0.01 *** -0.06 *** -0.02 *** -0.04 ***
(-9.21) (-57.97) (-29.19) (-56.99) (-7.99) (-63.77) (-21.9) (-35.99)
TANGIBILITY 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 *** 0.21 *** 0.18 ***
(14.12) (10.94) (11.55) (7.55) (24.14) (21.32)
R&D/SALES -0.17 *** -0.16 *** -0.17 *** -0.15 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 *** -0.28 *** -0.21 ***
(-15.88) (-14.09) (-28.23) (-25.74) (-6.22) (-6.85) (-23.36) (-17.79)
R&D DUMMY -0.04 *** -0.04 *** 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 ***
(-12.03) (-13.88) (0.66) (-1.53) (-12.45) (-14.42) (-12.48) (-11.1)
SGA/SALES -0.09 *** -0.12 *** -0.06 *** -0.08 *** -0.12 *** -0.15 ***
(-13.89) (-18.68) (-9.87) (-13.74) (-17.46) (-22.09)
LN SALES 0.03 *** 0.00 0.03 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 *** 0.01 ***
(43.08) (1.17) (47.6) (14.05) (50.49) (13.37)
LN ASSETS 0.01 *** 0.02 ***
(12.25) (22.64)
TAXSHIELD 0.91 *** 0.70 ***
(21.88) (18.19)
INTERCEPT 0.21 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.33 *** 0.23 *** 0.64 *** 0.13 *** 0.34 ***
(5.39) (10.21) (17.96) (8.37) (6.69) (18.61) (2.94) (7.62)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,530 41,362 50,414 50,267 46,934 46,934 46,934 46,934
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable: Leverage
Kayhan & Titman Fama & French Kayhan & Titman (debt net of all cash)
Kayhan & Titman 
(gross debt)
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Figure 1. Long-run abnormal returns after acquisition announcements 
Cumulative abnormal returns based on the Fama–French three-factor model and RATS; see text for description of 
the methodology. 
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